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I. INTRODUCTION 
Climate change poses an imminent threat to all of planet 
Earth that transcends national boundaries.1 In response, a 
 
     * Editors’ Note: The IPCC published the Sixth Assessment Report (AR6) on 
August 6, 2021.  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], Climate 
Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis (2021), 
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf.  
This article was already finalized for publication, and therefore references the 
Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report 
Summary for Policymakers, infra note 1. 
1. See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], Climate 
Change 2014 Synthesis Report Summary for Policymakers, at 8 (2014), 
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf 
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majority of the world’s countries have made some form of 
international commitment to protect the environment and 
mitigate the effects of climate change.2  For example, 195 
countries have signed the Paris Agreement, committing to 
pursue national efforts to limit the increase the  global average 
of  greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.3  The European Union (EU) 
has also enacted directives committing its member states to 
pursue national efforts to increase the development and 
implementation of renewable energy, consistent with the 
obligations of the Paris Agreement.4  Beyond making public 
declarations, these agreements in and of themselves do not 
actually provide a legal mechanism to enforce large substantive 
parts of the agreements.5  In other words, there is no internal 
enforcement mechanism written into these agreements to 
provide a way to hold states6 accountable for their commitments. 
As the threat of climate change intensifies,7  
environmentalists are using creative legal mechanisms to hold 
 
[hereinafter 2014 Climate Change Synthesis Report]. 
2. See, e.g., The Paris Agreement, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE, https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-
agreement/the-paris-agreement (last visited Aug. 10, 2021) (noting that the 
Paris Agreement “brings all nations into a common cause to undertake 
ambitious efforts to combat climate change and adapt to its effects”); What is 
the Kyoto Protocol?, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
https://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol (last visited Aug. 10, 2021) (“The Kyoto 
Protocol operationalizes the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change by committing industrialized countries . . . to limit and reduce 
greenhouse gases emissions in accordance with agreed individual targets”.). 
3. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of the Paris 
Agreement, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (Dec. 12, 2015) 
[hereinafter Paris Agreement]; see 7. d Paris Agreement: Chapter XXVII 
Environment, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION (Dec. 12, 2015), 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-
d&chapter=27&clang=_en. 
4. See, e.g., Renewable Energy Directive, EUR. COMM’N (July 16, 2014), 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/topics/renewable-energy/renewable-energy-
directive/overview_en (last updated Dec. 10, 2020) (explaining EU Directives 
2009/28/EC and 2018/2001/EU). 
5. David Roberts, The 5 Biggest Deceptions in Trump’s Paris Climate 
Speech, VOX (June 2, 2017, 8:20 AM), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-
environment/2017/6/2/15727984/deceptions-trump-paris-speech (explaining 
the non-binding nature of the Paris Agreement, stating that participating 
countries “determine their own targets and their own policies” and that “they 
can fail to meet the targets, without penalty”). 
6. This Comment will use the term “state” to refer to countries and 
nations in accordance with standard international terminology. 
7. 2014 Climate Change Synthesis Report, supra note 1, at 8. 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss2/8
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actors accountable for their impacts on the environment.8  This 
Comment proposes that a form of international arbitration 
called Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) may be a viable 
legal framework to enforce states’ international environmental 
commitments.9  ISDS is a legal framework commonly written 
into international investment agreements (IIAs) that allows 
investors from one state to bring arbitration actions directly 
against a foreign state for breaches of the IIA.10  An investor may 
bring an ISDS action against a foreign state for damages when 
he or she invests in the state relying on the state’s policy, and 
the state then changes its policy in a way that hurts the 
investment.11  To enforce a states’ international environmental 
agreement under, for example, the Paris Agreement or an EU 
Directive,  a renewable energy investor could bring an ISDS 
claim against a state who committed to decrease GHG emissions 
or promote renewable energy under the international 
agreement.  If the investor relied on the agreement in making 
his or her investment, and the state then enacts a policy 
drastically inconsistent with the agreement, the investor may be 
able to attain damages from the state.12  In principle, the 
prospect of responding to ISDS claims and paying investors 
large sums in damages would incentivize states to act in 
 
8. See, e.g., James Conca, Atmospheric Trust Litigation—Can We Sue 
Ourselves Over Climate Change?, FORBES (Nov. 23, 2014, 9:42 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2014/11/23/atmospheric-trust-
litigation-can-we-sue-ourselves-over-climate-change/#117396b40056 
(explaining state and federal Atmospheric Trust Litigation); Sara Mogharabi 
et al., Environmental Citizen Suits in the Trump Era, ABA, (Oct. 1, 2017), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/environment_energy_resources/publicati
ons/natural_resources_environment/2017-18/fall/environmental-citizen-suits-
trump-era/ (describing citizen suits brought under the Clean Water Act, Clean 
Air Act, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and Endangered Species 
Act). 
9. Caroline Simson, Int’l Law Seen as Path to Fight Climate Change, 
LAW360 (Apr. 18, 2019, 7:15 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1151466. 
10. David Gaukrodger & Kathryn Gordon, Investor State-Dispute 
Settlement: A Scoping Paper for the Investment Policy Community, OECD 
WORKING PAPERS ON INT’L INV. 10 (2012), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k46b1r85j6f-en; Tim R. Samples, Winning and 
Losing Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 56 AM. BUS. L.J. 115, 116 (2019) 
(citing Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An 
Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grant Bargain, 46 
HARV. INT’L. L.J. 66, 77 (2005)). 
11. Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 10, at 9. 
12. Simson, supra note 9. 
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accordance with their international environmental 
commitments. 
Part II of this comment provides a background on the 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement system and the two most 
common fora for ISDS claims.  Part II also discusses some 
common advantages and disadvantages of ISDS.  Part III lays 
out an example of how ISDS works in the context of an actual 
case, Eiser Infrastructure Ltd. and Energía Solar Luxembourg 
S.À.R.I. v. Kingdom of Spain (“E.S.L. v. Spain”).13  Part IV 
briefly explains the current state of the climate crisis and the 
importance of renewable energy.  Finally, Part V explains the 
logistics of how ISDS might be used to enforce international 
environmental agreements and considers some foreseeable 
roadblocks. 
II. INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
A. What is Investor-State Dispute Settlement? 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) is a legal 
mechanism for resolving claims that arise from breaches of 
international investment treaties.14  Under ISDS, foreign 
investors can obtain damages from foreign states that have 
breached their treaty obligations.15  In contrast to most domestic 
dispute resolution systems, ISDS allows private investors to 
bring claims directly against states through the arbitration 
system.16 
The vast majority ,approximately eighty-nine percent, of 
international investment agreements (IIAs) that provide for 
international ISDS are in the form of bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs).17  BITs establish investment commitments 
between two individual states.18  While most ISDS provisions 
are found in BITs, some multilateral agreements between more 
than two states also contain provisions providing for ISDS.19  For 
 
13. Eiser Infrastructure Ltd. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/13/36, Award (May 4, 2017) [hereinafter E.S.L. v. Spain]. 
14. Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 10, at 10. 
15. Id. at 10. 
16. Samples, supra note 10, at 117. 
17. Id. at 126. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. at 127. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss2/8
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example, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
a trade and investment treaty entered into by Canada, Mexico, 
and the United States as well as the Energy Charter Treaty 
(ECT), an international energy treaty which currently binds 
fifty-three countries, both contain ISDS provisions resembling 
those commonly found in BITs.20 
The presence of ISDS within investment treaties 
strengthens the reliability of states’ commitments to 
international investors and decreases the risks posed by 
investing in foreign states. Because the potential costs of ISDS 
are so great for a respondent host state,21  ISDS, in principle, 
creates a powerful incentive for states to honor the commitments 
they have made in investment treaties.22 
1. History of ISDS 
Before the establishment of ISDS, foreign investors had to 
depend on domestic arbitration systems or diplomatic processes 
to recover damages caused by another state’s violation of 
investment treaty obligations.23  According to the United 
Nations, in the decade and a half before the first BITs came into 
force, there were 875 takings of foreign investment properties in 
over sixty countries with no effective remedy.24 
IIAs including ISDS provisions have greatly increased in 
number over the past thirty years. As of 1990, about 500 
international investment treaties had been signed;25  as of 2017, 
more than 3,300 international investment treaties had been 
 
20. See, e.g., The Energy Charter Treaty art. 26, ¶ 4, Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 
U.N.T.S. 100; North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., ch. 11, 
Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M 289. 
21. See, e.g., Samples, supra note 10, at 144 (“[T]he net ISDS losses of 
Belize are worth almost one year of government spending). See, also, id. at 
149–50 (“UNCTAD calculates that a successful claimant is awarded about 
$522 million on average . . . Poland . . . has paid in excess of $4 billion in ISDS 
settlements.”). 
22. Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 10, at 10. 
23. See id. at 9. 
24. Scott Miller & Gregory N. Hicks, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A 




25. Samples, supra note 10, at 120. 
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signed.26  The number of ISDS settlements and arbitrations have 
also risen dramatically over the past decade alongside the rise 
in ISDS provisions.27  According to the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), about one 
hundred ISDS claims were initiated during the fifteen-year 
period between 1987–2002.28  As of 2003, that number had more 
than quadrupled and over five hundred ISDS cases were filed in 
the ten year period between 2003–2013.29 
The emergence of BITs and the establishment of the 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) reformed the system of enforcing fair treatment of 
international investors.30  After the creation of BITs and ICSID, 
parties could bring claims of unfair treatment of investors in 
front of a neutral panel.31  In the face of such a neutral panel, 
unlike in many domestic dispute settlement forums, 
international investors are treated with equal legal status as the 
states against which they bring their claims.32 
Some ISDS cases challenge states’ policies or changes in 
policies as breaches of IIAs.  While all sovereign states are 
accorded a level of deference and right to control their states’ 
policies, ISDS Tribunals have considered states’ policy 
modifications as grounds for breaches in IIAs when those 
policies are sufficiently detrimental to investors. 33 
2. Two Major Fora for ISDS: ICSID and UNCITRAL 
A majority of BITs that provide for ISDS call for the 
arbitration to be governed by the ICSID Convention,34 the 
 
26. Id. 




31. Id. at 5. 
32. Id. at 5. 
33. See, e.g., E.S.L. v. Spain, supra note 13 (considering whether Spain’s 
policies modifying the regulatory regime for renewable energy constituted a 
breach of the ECT); Philip Morris Brands S.á.r.l. v. Oriental Republic of 
Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award (July 8, 2016) [hereinafter Philip 
Morris v. Uruguay] (considering whether Uruguay’s policies modifying the 
marketing requirements for tobacco products constituted a breach of the BIT). 
34. See generally Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
Between States and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1720, 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss2/8
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United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL),35  or provide a choice between the two fora.36 
ICSID was established by the Convention on the Settlement 
of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States (ICSID Convention).37  The purpose of ICSID is to provide 
facilities for conciliation and arbitration of investment dispute 
claims between investors of contracting states and nationals of 
other contracting states.38  UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules were 
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly.39  Similar to 
ICSID, UNCITRAL was created as a procedural mechanism for 
resolving disputes arising from international investment 
through conciliation or arbitration.40 
The 2006 ICSID Regulations and Rules (ICSID Rules) and 
the 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (UNCITRAL Rules) both 
provide similar procedural mechanisms for bringing and 
resolving ISDS claims.  For example, both the ICSID Rules and 
the UNCITRAL Rules extend jurisdiction over any legal dispute 
that arises directly out of an investment between a state and a 
national of another state.41  The two systems also have similar 
rules for appointing arbitrators to the arbitral tribunal, both of 
which provide for an arbitral tribunal composed of three 
arbitrators, unless the parties decide otherwise.42  Under the 
ICSID Rules, unless the parties decide otherwise, each party 
gets to appoint one arbitrator, and the parties must agree on the 
appointment of a third arbitrator.43  Under the UNCITRAL 
Rules, the third arbitrator is chosen by the two arbitrators 
 
575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention]; International Center for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes Convention, Regulations 
and Rules, ICSID/15 (Apr. 10, 2006) [hereinafter ICSID 2006 Regulations 
and Rules]. 
35. G.A. Res. 65/22, United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law Arbitration Rules (Apr. 2010) [hereinafter UNCITRAL 2010 Arbitration 
Rules]. 
36. Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 10, at 53. 
37. ICSID Convention, supra note 34. 
38. ICSID 2006 Regulations and Rules, supra note 34, at art. 1. 
39. UNCITRAL 2010 Arbitration Rules, supra note 35. 
40. Id. at art. 17. 
41. ICSID 2006 Regulations and Rules, supra note 34, at art. 25; 
UNCITRAL 2010 Arbitration Rules, supra note 35, at art. 1. 
42. ICSID 2006 Regulations and Rules, supra note 34, at art. 29; 
UNCITRAL 2010 Arbitration Rules, supra note 35, at art. 7. 
43. ICSID 2006 Regulations and Rules, supra note 34, at art. 29. 
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chosen by the parties.44  The ICSID Rules and UNCITRAL Rules 
are also similar in that they provide for final, binding awards.45  
Overall, the ICSID Rules and UNCITRAL Rules provide two 
relatively similar arbitration processes. 
B. Advantages and Disadvantages of ISDS 
1. Advantages of ISDS 
ISDS generally serves as protection for international 
investors, as it permits them to obtain compensation should the 
investment lose significant value due to state actions.46  The 
existence of ISDS and possibility of recovering from breaches of 
treaty obligations encourages foreign investors to invest in 
states without fear of unfair treatment or discrimination.47  As a 
result, ISDS promotes foreign direct investment (FDI).48  ISDS 
is especially useful for promoting FDI when one of the parties is 
a low-income or middle-income country.49  Investment experts 
have found that ISDS provisions effectively establish the 
credibility of BITs and induce foreign direct investment (FDI).50  
Increased FDI has been well-documented to benefit the national 
economies for host states, especially developing economies.51  As 
countries develop, an inward flow of FDI helps further the 
country’s integration into the global economy.52 
In addition to its economic benefits, FDI often improves the 
environmental and social conditions of a host country.53  For 
example, technologies brought to low-income and middle-income 
 
44. UNCITRAL 2010 Arbitration Rules, supra note 35, at art. 9. 
45. Id. at art. 34; ICSID Regulations and Rules, supra note 34, at art. 53. 
46. Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 10, at 9. 
47. Assessing the Trans-Pacific Partnership, 1 PETERSON INST. INT’L ECON. 
109 (Feb. 2016), https://www.piie.com/system/files/documents/piieb16-1.pdf 
[hereinafter Assessing the TPP]. 
48. Miller & Hicks, supra note 24, at 6 (“The most apparent reason for the 
rise in ISDS arbitrations is the concurrent rise in the stock of foreign direct 
investment (FDI).”). 
49. Assessing the TPP, supra note 47, at 109. 
50. Id. at 111. 
51. Foreign Direct Investment for Development Maximising Benefits, 
Minimising Costs, OECD 5 (2002), 
https://www.oecd.org/investment/investmentfordevelopment/1959815.pdf. 
52. Id. at 11.  
53. Id. at 5. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss2/8
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countries via FDI are generally more modern and environment-
friendly than the technologies that are available locally.54 
The benefits and effectiveness of ISDS come largely from the 
mere possibility of investors bringing a claim, rather than from 
the actual arbitration of claims.  Out of all of the BITs that are 
in force with ISDS provisions, approximately ninety percent of 
them have never seen a single dispute raised.55  While the 
number and frequency of ISDS claims is rising, that rise is 
consistent with and proportionate to a rise in FDI flow.56 
2. Disadvantages of ISDS 
Critics argue that ISDS undermines states’ sovereignty by 
providing a way for investors to pressure host states into 
changing policies that may have been determined to be for the 
benefit of that states’ people.57  For example, foreign investors 
from the oil and gas industries have brought claims against host 
countries for enacting policies or taxes that harm oil and gas 
investments, even when such policies were enacted to mitigate 
climate change and promote environmental protectionism.58 
There is also an issue of outcome distribution regarding 
ISDS cases brought from different countries.  ISDS claimants 
are usually from high-income countries (86.25% of ISDS 
claimants are from high-income countries), with far fewer 
claimants from upper-middle income countries and lower-
middle income countries, and “no ISDS claims brought by 
investors from low-income countries.”59  On the other hand, 
respondents in ISDS cases are most frequently upper-middle 
income countries and lower-middle income countries, with high-
income countries as the respondent in only 27.55% of ISDS 
 
54. Id. at 19. 
55. Id. at 7. 
56. Id. at 3. 
57. Id. at 3. 
58. See, e.g., Clayton v. Government of Canada, PCA No. 2009-04, 
UNCTAD (2008), (discussing claims arising from Government rejecting 
investors’ project following a negative environmental assessment); Mobil 
Investments Canada Inc. v. Government of Canada, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/07/4, UNCTAD (2007), (discussing claims arising from Government 
regulatory changes affecting investors projects with oil fields). 
59. Samples, supra note 10, at 143. 
9
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cases.60 
Another major concern with ISDS is a lack of transparency.  
According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), only eighteen of the eighty-five cases 
heard before the United Nations Permanent Court of Arbitration 
were made public.61  Settlements, which comprise a major 
portion of ISDS cases, are even less transparent than ISDS 
arbitration, and there are no public records of a majority of ISDS 
settlements.62  ISDS might have a greater influence on states’ 
policy modifications if the results of those cases were more 
readily available to the public.63 
In light of criticisms surrounding ISDS, some countries have 
begun to re-examine their relationship with ISDS and BITs in 
general. For example, Indonesia and South Africa have publicly 
stated their intent to allow existing IIAs containing ISDS 
provisions to lapse, and Ecuador and Venezuela both officially 
withdrew from the ICSID Convention.64 
III. ISDS IN PRACTICE: A CASE STUDY 
Eiser Structure Limited and Energía Solar Luxembourg 
S.á.r.l. v. Kingdom of Spain (E.S.L. v. Spain) is illustrative of a 
successful ISDS case in which the claimants were renewable 
energy investors.65  After Spain modified its regulatory and 
economic regime for renewable energy projects following the 
2011 general election,66  renewable energy investors from 
various countries brought ISDS claims against the Kingdom of 
Spain (Spain or Respondent).67  In E.S.L. v. Spain, investors 
 
60. See id. at 143. 
61. Assessing the TPP, supra note 47, at 117. 
62. Samples, supra note 10, at 140. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 147. 
65. See E.S.L v. Spain, supra note 13. 
66. See id. ¶ 137–150. 
67. See, e.g., Antin Infrastructure Services Lux. S.a.r.l. v. Kingdom of 
Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/31, UNCTAD (2013) (involving claimant 
renewable energy investors from Luxembourg and Netherlands); Cube 
Infrastructure Fund SIVAC v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/20, 
UNCTAD (2015), (involving claimants renewable energy investors from 
France and Luxembourg); European Solar Farms v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID 
Case No. Arb/18/45, UNCTAD (2018) (involving claimant renewable energy 
investors from Denmark); Itochu Corp. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss2/8
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from Luxembourg and the United Kingdom (U.K.) initiated 
arbitration against Spain. Claimants argued, among other 
things, that Spain denied them fair and equitable treatment in 
violation of the Energy Treaty Charter by enacting the 
aforementioned policy changes.68  This Section describes the 
procedural mechanisms used in E.S.L. v. Spain and the 
substantive arguments considered by the Tribunal in deciding 
the case in favor of the Claimant investors. 
A. Factual Background 
In 2001, the European Union (EU) adopted a policy of 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) through 
development of renewable energy.69  EU Directive 2001/77/EC 
set out binding targets for EU member countries to develop 
renewable energy, and declared that subsidies for the renewable 
energy sector would be necessary to reach these targets.70  In the 
years that followed, Spain adopted a series of measures to 
regulate, facilitate, and incentivize the production of renewable 
energy consistent with EU Directive 2001/77/EC.71  In February 
of 2007, Spain adopted Royal Decree 661/2007 (“RD 661/2007”) 
to increase remuneration for facilities using technologies to 
comply with the targets outlined under EU Directive 2001/77/EC 
and Spain’s Renewable Energy Plan.72  RD 661/2007 based 
remuneration on the amount of energy produced by renewable 
 
ARB/18/25, UNCTAD (2018) (involving claimant renewable energy investors 
from Japan). 
68. See E.S.L v. Spain, supra note 13, ¶ 349 (“Claimants contend that 
Respondent’s actions in entirely eliminating and replacing the . . . regime 
violated Spain’s obligations under the ECT by (1) expropriating their 
investment contrary to Article 13; (2) denying fair and equitable treatment 
contrary to Article 10; (3) subjecting Claimants’ investments to unreasonable 
measures, contrary to Article 10(1); and (4) failing to honor undertakings 
entered into with Claimants’ investments, again contrary to Article 10(1).”). 
69. Id. ¶ 101 (citing EU Directive 2001/77/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 238) 33-44). 
70. Id. 
71. See id. ¶ 102, 107.  For example, Parliament of Electricity Law 54/1997 
“provided the legal framework for regulation of electrical sector during most of 
the period at issue” by guaranteeing investors of renewable energy reasonable; 
1998, 2002, 2004 Royal Decrees regulated and facilitated production from 
renewable sources and provided incentives to producers; 2005-2010 Renewable 
Energy set out Spanish Government’s policy for attaining renewable energy 
targets set by the EU in EU directive 2001/77EC. 
72. Id. ¶ 109. 
11
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plants and guaranteed that all production of renewable energy 
would be subject to a new tariff scheme that permits investors 
to choose between two types of tariffs. 73 
Following the adoption of RD 661/2007, Claimants Eiser 
Infrastructure Limited (EIL), a private limited company 
incorporated under the laws of the United Kingdom, and 
Energía Solar Luxembourg S.á.r.l. (ESL), a limited liability 
corporation incorporated under the laws of Luxembourg and 
wholly owned by EIL (collectively, “Claimants”) invested in a 
Concentrated Solar-Thermal Power (CSP)74  plant in Spain at its 
initial stages of development.75  Claimants concluded that the 
investment in CSP in Spain had promising business potential, 
largely based on the favorable characteristics and expectation of 
stable cash flow provided by RD 661/2007.76  Claimants acquired 
a shareholding interest of eighty percent of the ASTE project by 
October of 2007.77  After Claimants invested more than €126 
million in the project, the plant began operation in October of 
2012.78 
In December of 2011, Spain elected a new prime minister 
who “called for structural reforms in the energy system”.79  In 
the years that followed, Spain implemented a series of changes 
to the regime including a seven percent tax on energy 
production,80 remuneration to be calculated based on capacity 
instead of production,81  and the elimination of the tariff regime 
set out in RD 661/2007.82  The new measures significantly 
reduced the “subsidies paid to CSP and other renewables 
generators,” and placed a new additional tax on the generators.83 
 
73. Id. ¶ 148. 
74. See Solar Energy Technologies Office, Concentrating Solar-Thermal 
Power, ENERGY.GOV, https://www.energy.gov/eere/solar/concentrating-solar-
power (last visited Aug. 10, 2021).  Concentrated Solar-Thermal Power (CSP) 
is a system that generates electricity by converting energy from sunlight into 
heat energy using lenses to concentrate a large area of sun onto a receiver, 
which drives a steam engine connected to an electrical power generator.  Id. 
75. See E.S.L v. Spain, supra note 13, ¶ 117. 
76. Id. ¶ 117. 
77. Id. ¶ 120. 
78. Id. ¶ 121. 
79. Id. ¶ 137. 
80. Id. ¶ 144. 
81. Id. ¶ 148. 
82. Id. ¶ 145. 
83. Id. ¶ 150. 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss2/8
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Under the new regime, the ASTE project’s revenues “. . .  
dropped sharply from those projected by the investors . . . under 
the prior regime,”84 forcing the operating companies into debt. 
EIL’s founding partner said the project lost all value, as the 
original €126 million invested by Claimants was now valued at 
only €4 million.85 
B. Procedural Background 
The states involved in this action, Spain, Luxembourg, and 
the United Kingdom, are all member states of the Energy 
Charter Treaty of 1998 (ECT), which established a legal 
framework to promote cooperation in the energy field.86  The 
ECT contains an ISDS provision in Article 26, which governs 
treaty “disputes between a Contracting Party and an Investor of 
another Contracting party relating to an Investment of the latter 
in the Area of the former.”87  If parties cannot settle their case 
amicably, Article 26 directs the investor party to submit the case 
for resolution to either the ICSID Convention, UNICITRAL, or 
the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce.88 
In accordance with ECT Article 26, Claimants in this case 
chose to request arbitration against Respondent under the 
ICSID Convention, and the parties complied with the ICSID 
Rules and Regulations.89  Parties agreed to constitute a tribunal 
consisting of three arbitrators: one appointed by each of the two 
parties, and a third arbitrator, the president of the tribunal, 
appointed by the agreement of both parties.90  Respondent 
 
84. Id. ¶ 151. 
85. Id. ¶ 154. 
86. Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 20, at art. 2 (“This Treaty 
establishes a legal framework in order to promote long-term co-operation in 
the energy field, based on complementarities and mutual benefits, in 
accordance with the objectives and principles of the Charter.”). 
87. Id. at art. 26 ¶ 1. 
88. Id. at art. 26 ¶ 4. 
89. E.S.L v. Spain, supra note 13, ¶¶ 6, 7. 
90. Id. ¶¶ 8, 9. (noting that members of the Tribunal were “Professor John 
R. Crook, a national of the United States, President, appointed by the 
Chairman of the ICSID Administrative Council in accordance with the Parties’ 
agreement on the method of constitution; Dr. Stanimir Alexandrov, a national 
of Bulgaria, appointed by Claimants; and Professor Campbell McLachlan QC, 
a national of New Zealand, appointed by Respondent.  Ms. Luisa Fernanda 
Torres, ICSID Legal Counsel, . . .  serve[d] as Secretary of the Tribunal”). 
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challenged the tribunal’s jurisdiction to hear Claimant’s 
claims,91  but the tribunal overruled Respondent’s objections to 
jurisdiction and decided the case on its merits. 92 
C. Claims 
Claimants contended that they reasonably relied upon the 
inducements and promises of Respondent, particularly the 
regime established in RD 661/2007,93 and that Respondent 
violated its obligations under the ECT by implementing 
measures that changed the economic regime for CSP plants 
under which Claimants invested €126 million in CSP.94  
Claimants relied on the stability of Respondent’s regulatory 
regime when they initially decided to invest in the ASTE project 
and throughout the process of building the plants, and 
Respondent’s regulatory authorities continually confirmed that 
the project would be subject to the incentives provided by RD 
661/2007 throughout the process.95 
Claimants alleged that Respondents violated various 
obligations under the ECT by drastically altering the regulatory 
regime and substituting it with a totally different regime, 
culminating in the elimination of the RD 661/2007 regime.96  
Specifically, Claimants contended that Respondent violated 
Articles 10 and 13 of the ECT by expropriating Claimants’ 
investment,  denying Claimants fair and equitable treatment,  
subjecting Claimants’ investments to unreasonable measures,  
and failing to honor undertakings entered into with Claimants’ 
investments.97  Respondents disputed the claims and contended 
that there had been no violations of the ECT.98 
 
91. Id. ¶¶ 160, 208, 232, 250, 273, 299. 
92. Id. ¶ 298.  The Tribunal sustained one of Respondent’s objections to 
jurisdiction on Claimants’ expropriation claim but found that it was not 
necessary to decide the expropriation claim as the case could be resolved on 
another basis. 
93. Id. ¶ 347. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. ¶ 121. 
96. Id. ¶ 348. 
97. Id. ¶ 349. 
98. Id. ¶ 350. 
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss2/8
270 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  41.2 
D. Tribunal’s Analysis 
The Tribunal assessed the Parties’ claims under Article 
10(1) of the ECT, which states that, “Each Contracting Party 
shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, encourage 
and create stable, equitable, favourable and transparent 
conditions for Investors of other Contracting Parties to make 
Investments in its area,” including “a commitment to accord at 
all times to Investments of Investors of other Contracting 
Parties fair and equitable treatment.”99  Taking into account the 
context and purpose of the ECT,  the tribunal concluded that 
Respondent’s obligation under Article 10(1) necessarily includes 
an obligation to provide “fundamental stability” in the essential 
characteristics of the legal regime relied upon by investors 
making long-term investments.100  Recognizing that regulatory 
regimes usually change over time, the tribunal acknowledged 
that investors must expect the possibility that reasonable 
changes in the legal framework may be made and that states 
maintain the right to modify their regulatory regimes to meet 
evolving circumstances and public needs.101  However, the ECT 
Article 10(1) obligation to accord fair and equitable treatment 
means that states cannot alter regulatory regimes applied to 
existing investment so radically that it deprives investors who 
relied on those regimes of the value of their investment.102 
While recognizing that Claimants could not have reasonably 
expected that there would be no change whatsoever to the RD 
661/2007, the Tribunal held that Article 10(1) entitled them to 
expect that Respondent would not drastically and abruptly 
revise the regime on which their investment depended in a way 
that destroyed its value.103  The Tribunal found that Respondent 
violated its obligation under Article 10(1) to accord Claimants 
fair and equitable treatment when it eliminated a favorable 
regulatory regime that was previously available to Claimants 
and encouraged their investment in CSP, and replaced it with 
an radically different regulatory approach that stripped 
 
99. Id. ¶ 374 (quoting Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 20, at art. 10(1)). 
100. Id. ¶ 382. 
101. Id. ¶ 382. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. ¶ 419. 
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Claimants of virtually all the value of their investment.104 
E. Costs and Award 
Violation of a treaty obligation that causes injury entitles 
the injured party to compensation for the injury sustained.105  
Under the ICSID Convention Rules and Regulations, the 
Tribunal shall determine an award that shall be binding on the 
Parties and determine the allocation of arbitration cost as part 
of the award.106  In light of its determination that Respondents 
violated Article 10(1) of the ECT by failing to accord fair and 
equitable treatments to Claimants, the Tribunal awarded 
Claimants €128 million as damages to be paid by Respondent.107  
Acknowledging that Tribunals often award arbitration costs to 
the prevailing party, the Tribunal determined that each party 
shall bear its own costs because the case involved challenging 
procedural and legal issues which both Parties addressed.108 
IV. RENEWABLE ENERGY AND THE CLIMATE CHANGE CRISIS 
The final Section of this paper advocates for the use of ISDS 
to enforce states’ commitments to combat climate change.109  For 
context of the importance and reason for mitigating climate 
change, especially by promoting renewable energy, this Section 
briefly explains the threats posed by climate change and the role 
that renewable energy can play in mitigating those threats. 
In 2014, the United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change published a Synthesis Report (Report), 
providing key findings of evaluations of underlying scientific 
understanding of climate change made by three working groups 
of the IPCC.110  The Report states that the “[w]arming of the 
climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s, many of the 
observed changes are unprecedented over decades to 
 
104. Id. ¶¶ 413, 419. 
105. Id. ¶ 423 (citing International Law Commission’s State 
Responsibility Articles 31, which the Tribunal regards as the applicable 
international law rules). 
106. ICSID 2006 Regulations and Rules, supra note 34, at art. 60, 61. 
107. E.S.L v. Spain, supra note 13, ¶ 473. 
108. Id. ¶ 484. 
109. See infra Section V. 
110. 2014 Climate Change Synthesis Report, supra note 1, at 2. 
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millennia.”111  Current observed changes including the warming 
of the atmosphere and ocean, melting of snow ice, and rising of 
sea level,112  affect natural and human systems such as water 
resources, species health, crop yields, and the frequency of 
extreme weather events.113  Without substantial changes to 
mitigate and adapt to climate change, these existing impacts are 
predicted to continue to worsen alongside new risks including 
reduced food security, reduced renewable water resources, 
exacerbated human health problems, compromised human 
activities such as agriculture and working outdoors, and 
increased displacement of peoples.114 
The Report states it is extremely likely that the dominant 
cause of observed warming since the mid-twentieth century was 
caused by anthropogenic GHG emissions together with other 
anthropogenic forces.115  About seventy-eight percent of the total 
GHG emissions increase from 1970–2010 are attributed to 
emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) from fossil fuel combustion 
and industrial processes, and continued GHG emissions will 
cause further warming and changes in the climate system.116  
Mitigation of climate change therefore requires substantial 
reductions of GHG emissions.  Relative to fossil fuels, renewable 
energy technologies have low specific GHG emissions into the 
atmosphere, “which makes them useful tools for addressing 
climate change”.117  Renewable energy technology likely has the 
technical potential to satisfy the global energy demand.118  
Policies promoting the research, development, and deployment 
of renewable energy technologies have helped increase growth of 
renewable energy in recent years.119  Such policies can help 





113. Id. at 5. 
114. Id. at 13. 
115. Id. at 4. 
116. Id. at 5. 
117. See Special Rep. of the IPCC, Renewable Energy Sources and 
Climate Change Mitigation, 174 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 Renewable Energy 
Report]. 
118. Id. at 10. 
119. Id. at 15. 
120. Id. at 194 (explaining financial and environmental risks associated 
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There are a variety of international agreements or policies 
under which parties have committed to combat climate change, 
some specifically committing to increase the use of renewable 
energy.121  Large portions of these agreements, however, are 
unenforceable.122  For example, the Paris Agreement, currently 
signed by 195 states, sets a substantive goal to limit the 
“increase in global average temperature to well below 2°C above 
pre-industrial levels and pursu[e] efforts to limit the 
temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels.”123  
There is also a procedural requirement that each party must put 
forward nationally determined contributions (NDCs) every five 
years detailing the domestic measures it intends to achieve in 
pursuit of the Agreement’s goals.124 Compliance with the NDCs 
is generally enforceable by a committee set out in Article 15 of 
the Agreement,125 but the actual substantive goals set out in  
Article 2 of the Agreement, and in each Party’s individual NDCs, 
are not enforceable under the Agreement.126 
V. USING ISDS TO ENFORCE ENVIRONMENTAL OBLIGATIONS 
ISDS typically serves as a form of protection for 
international investors to ensure that the conditions under 
which they made an investment will be honored, and to provide 
for compensation when a host State significantly modifies those 
conditions in a way that hurts the investment.127  In addition to 
protecting individual investors, ISDS could also be used as a 
legal mechanism to enforce environmental commitments that 
states have made in international agreements such as the Paris 
Agreement or EU Directive 2018/2001/EC.128 
 
with investment in commercial renewable energy projects). 
121. See generally Paris Agreement, supra note 3; What is the Kyoto 
Protocol?, supra note 2. 
122. Roberts, supra note 5. 
123. Paris Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 2. 
124. Id. at art. 4; see 21st Session of the Conference of the Parties to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, CTR. FOR CLIMATE 
& ENERGY SOLS., https://www.c2es.org/content/cop-21-paris/ (last visited Aug. 
10, 2020). 
125. Paris Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 15. 
126. Harold Hongju Koh, Triptych’s End: A Better Framework to Evaluate 
21st Century International Lawmaking, 126 YALE L.J.F. 338, 352 (2017). 
127. Simson, supra note 9. 
128. Paris Agreement, supra note 3; see Directive 2018/2001/EC, 2018 
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Both the Paris Agreement and EU Directive 2018/2001/EC 
contain substantive commitments to mitigate climate change, in 
addition to procedural requirements. For example, under Article 
2 of the Paris Agreement, parties commit to “[h]olding the 
increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C 
above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the 
temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels, 
recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and 
impacts of climate change”.129  EU Directive 2018/2001/EC, 
which was established in part to help the EU meet its 
commitments under the Paris Agreement to reduce GHG 
emissions, established a goal for the EU to fulfill at least thirty-
two percent of its energy needs through the use of renewable 
energy by 2030.130  Unfortunately, however, the agreements 
themselves do not provide for a mechanism to enforce those 
substantive commitments. 
There are internally enforceable commitments in both the 
Paris Agreement and EU Directive 2018/2001/EC, but these are 
usually the procedural requirements. Under Article 4 of the 
Paris Agreement, “[i]n order to achieve the long-term 
temperature goal set out in Article 2,” “[e]ach Party shall 
prepare, communicate and maintain successive national 
determined contributions that it intends to achieve,” and “shall 
pursue domestic mitigation measures, with the aim of achieving 
the objectives of such contributions.”131  The word “shall” creates 
a binding commitment.132 The procedural commitment set out in 
Article 4 for each party to prepare nationally determined 
contributions (NDCs) is enforceable through Article 15.133  
Article 15 establishes an “expert-based and facilitative” 
committee to “facilitate implementation and promote 
compliance” with the Agreement.134  Similarly, EU Directive 
 
O.J. (L 328/82).  EU Directive 2018/2001/EC is a revised version of the original 
EU Directive 2009/28/EC, which established an overall policy for production 
and promotion of energy from renewable sources, and required the EU to fulfill 
at least twenty percent of its total energy needs with RE by 2020, to be 
achieved through attainment of individual countries. 
129. Paris Agreement, supra note 3, at art. 2. 
130. EU Directive 2018/2001/EC, supra note 128. 
131. Paris Agreement, supra note 3, at art. 2. 
132. Hongju, supra note 126, at 352. 
133. Paris Agreement, supra note 3, at art. 15. 
134. Id. 
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2018/2001/EC requires member states to draft “renewable 
energy action plans” and report their progress to the 
Commission.135 
Simply put: the Paris Agreement and the EU Directive 
2018/2001/EC both provide enforcement mechanisms for the 
procedural requirements of the agreement, but neither provide 
for a way to enforce the parties’ substantive commitments to 
limit GHG emissions or promote renewable energy to a specific 
target. As these commitments are not internally enforceable, 
ISDS could present an opportunity for investors to enforce 
states’ commitments. 
A. Logistics of Using ISDS to Enforce States’ International 
Environmental Commitments 
As demonstrated by E.S.L v. Spain, an investor may have a 
valid ISDS claim challenging a states’ policy changes if they can 
prove that (1) the host state had a stated policy; (2) an investor 
from another state made an investment in the host state in 
reasonable reliance of the stated policy; and (3) the host state 
changed its policy or enacted a policy that did not match its 
rhetoric in a way that significantly hurt the investor’s 
investment in an unforeseen way.136 For an ISDS claim seeking 
to enforce a states’ international environmental commitment, 
the first element of the claim would most likely be a domestic 
policy enacted in pursuit of the goals set out in an international 
agreement such as the Paris Agreement or EU Directive 
2018/2001/EC.  Then, for the second element a foreign investor 
must have made an investment in the state in reasonable 
reliance of the states’ commitment or policy. Under agreements 
such as the Paris Agreement or EU Directive 2018/2001/EC, 
parties make public, transparent commitments that they will 
reduce GHG emissions and promote renewable energy. It would 
then be reasonable for an investor to rely on a states’ policies 
that are consistent with those agreements, because the state has 
committed to maintain policies in pursuit of the goals set out in 
the agreement.  
One example of a party that may be in the positions to bring 
 
135. See Directive 2018/2001/EC, supra note 128, ¶ 30. 
136. See infra, Section III. 
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such a claim would be a renewable energy investor who invests 
in a state relying on the state’s public commitment to reduce 
GHGs and promote renewable energy. If the host state then 
significantly changes the policy or enacts a policy that is 
inconsistent with its international commitments, and the 
investment is hurt by such changes, the investor may be able to 
hold the state liable for damages through ISDS. 
This type of ISDS case would enforce agreements like the 
Paris Agreement and EU Directive 2018/2001/EC primarily 
through deterrence. In principle, if states are aware that, 
through these cases, they could potentially be liable for millions 
or billions137 of dollars in damages when they enact policies 
inconsistent with their prior agreements, they will be 
incentivized to act in accordance with their agreements to avoid 
such damages. In cases where the challenged policy is a national 
policy put in place in pursuit of the international agreement, the 
agreement itself may play a role in proving that the investor had 
reason to rely on the policy. It is unclear whether the 
international agreement itself could suffice as a policy to 
challenge, or whether investors would have to challenge 
domestic policies that states enacted in accordance with their 
commitments made in the international agreements. 
E.S.L v. Spain is, in many ways, illustrative of how such a 
claim would work.  In E.S.L v. Spain, Spain adopted a Royal 
Decree incentivizing the production of renewable energy in 
response to a 2001 EU directive that set out targets for EU 
member countries to develop renewable energy, similar to EU 
Directive 2018/2001/EC.138  Based  largely on the Royal Decree, 
the Claimants decided to invest in a solar energy project in 
Spain.139 Years later, Spain’s new prime minister adopted a 
Royal Decree that both reduced the subsidies Claimants 
expected to receive under the initial Royal Decree, and placed a 
tax on Claimants’ operation.140 As a result, Claimants’ 
investment lost almost all of its value.141 Claimants were then 
able to bring an ISDS claim against Spain and recovered 
 
137. Samples, supra note 10. 
138. See E.S.L v. Spain, supra note 13, ¶ 101 (citing EU Directive 
2001/77/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 238) 33-44). 
139. Id. ¶ 121. 
140. Id. ¶ 348. 
141. Id. ¶ 154. 
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damages. 
In principle, as a result of a case like E.S.L. v. Spain, states 
should be incentivized to maintain policies that are consistent 
with their Directives and agreements in order to avoid going 
through ISDS cases and potentially paying out substantial 
damages. Even if an investor claimant’s case fails and they are 
not awarded damages, the state would still have to go through 
the lengthy and expensive process of arbitration or settlement.  
A similar case could be brought against a state that enacts a 
policy inconsistent with the Paris Agreement instead of an EU 
Directive. 
B. Potential Roadblocks 
In theory, using ISDS to enforce international 
environmental commitments could work.  There are, a number 
of foreseeable roadblocks that such a claim would have to 
overcome. 
As a jurisdictional requirement, in order to bring an ISDS 
claim there must be an IIA between the investor state and the 
host state that provides for ISDS to govern breaches of the IIA. 
However, with BITs between individual countries and 
multilateral agreements between groups of countries, the 
jurisdictional hurdle likely would not be a great one.142 
Another potential issue with using ISDS to enforce 
environmental obligations is that deterrence is the primary 
consequence which could, in principle, drive states to fulfill their 
commitments. A winning claimant is not obligated to use its 
award to reinvest in renewable energy, or to use the money in 
any pro-environment way.143 The positive environmental impact 
from these cases would come instead from incentivizing states to 
 
142. See generally The Database of Bilateral Investment Treaties, ICSID 
WORLD BANK DATABASE, 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/resources/Bilateral-Investment-Treaties-
Database.aspx#a61 (last visited Aug. 10, 2021) (collecting a comprehensive 
database of all existing BITs by Party. Major developed countries who have 
either signed the Paris Agreement or are part of the EU and would be prime 
targets for these claims have BITs in place with over one hundred other 
countries).  Countries with over hundred BITs include: Belgium-Luxembourg, 
China, Czech Republic, France, German, Italy, Netherlands, Romania, 
Switzerland, and the UK.  Id. 
143. Simson, supra note 9. 
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fulfill their commitments in order to avoid paying large ISDS 
damages.144 
Additionally, the damages themselves may not be 
sufficiently detrimental to a state to serve as an effective 
deterrence. From an economic standpoint, the state’s fossil fuel 
industry, for example, could benefit the state’s economy more 
than paying off ISDS damages would hurt. In that case, the 
ISDS damages alone probably would not be enough to urge the 
state to enact policies favoring renewable energy over fossil 
fuels. 
The last, and perhaps greatest potential hurdle for ISDS 
claims is the standard of review. As explained by the tribunal in 
E.S.L. v. Spain, sovereign states have the right to modify their 
policies, and investors must expect reasonable modifications.145  
To constitute a breach of treaty obligations, policy changes must 
be substantially unforeseeable and drastic.  There are many 
ISDS cases challenging States’ policy changes when the changes 
were not found to amount to a breach.146  For example, in Philip 
Morris v. Uruguay, the claimants, investors in a cigarette 
company, challenged Uruguay’s regulatory changes precluding 
tobacco manufacturers from marketing certain variants of 
cigarettes and increased the size of health warnings on cigarette 
packages.147  The tribunal determined that the regulatory 
changes did not have a substantial effect on the claimants’ 
investment, and did not constitute a breach of a relevant BIT.148  
In E.S.L. v. Spain, the tribunal found that Spain’s policy 
changes were substantial and did constitute a breach of the 
ECT.149  In that case, the regulatory regime under which 
claimants invested was drastically overhauled and practically 
deprived the claimants’ investment of all value.150   
Environmentalists should be strategic in choosing which 
ISDS claims to pursue to enforce states’ environmental 




145. E.S.L. v. Spain, supra note 13, ¶ 382. 
146. See, e.g., Philip Morris v. Uruguay, supra note 33. 
147. Id. ¶ 9. 
148. Id. ¶ 276. 
149. E.S.L. v. Spain, supra note 13, ¶ 382. 
150. Id. ¶ 413. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
There is intrinsic value in states publicly committing to 
combat climate change through international agreements and 
policies such as the Paris Agreement and EU Directive 
2008/2001/EC, as they provide frameworks for states to enact 
domestic climate policies.151  There are also, however, 
substantive commitments within these agreements that, if 
enforceable, would be instrumental in ensuring that states 
actually follow through by enacting policies that mitigate 
climate change and promote renewable energy. While many of 
the substantive commitments made in international 
environmental agreements are not internally enforceable, ISDS 
may be a useful tool to enforce them. ISDS could be used to deter 
states from acting inconsistent with their international 
agreements because states may be liable for damages to 
renewable energy investors hurt by the states’ policies. 
There are a handful of potential reasons why using ISDS to 
enforce states’ international commitments may prove difficult.152  
However, the consequences of successfully enforcing such 
commitments could be quite significant in combating climate 
change.153  Environmentalists should give considerable thought 
to the potential of ISDS as a mechanism to hold states 
accountable for the substantive commitments made in 
international environmental agreements. 
 
 
151. Frédéric Gilles Sourgens, Climate Commons Law: The 
Transformative Force of the Paris Agreement, 50 N.Y.U J. INT’L L. & POL. 885, 
889 (2018). 
152. See supra Section V(B). 
153. See 2014 Climate Change Synthesis Report, supra note 1, at 2 
(noting that GHG emissions must be significantly reduced to mitigate climate 
change); Paris Agreement, supra note 3, at art. 2 (If enforced, Parties would be 
required to hold the increase in global average temperature to below 2°C above 
pre-industrial levels and pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 
1.5°C above pre-industrial levels); EU Directive 2018/2001/EC, supra note 128, 
¶ 30 (If enforced, Parties would be required to fulfill at least 32% of its energy 
needs with renewable energy by 2030). 
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